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A B S T R A C T
People with schizophrenia have deﬁcits in retrieving the source of memory information. Research has focused
on two types of judgements: reality monitoring (discriminating internally-generated stimuli from external
information) and internal source monitoring (distinguishing two diﬀerent internal sources). The aim of the
current study was to assess the relation between schizotypy and both types of source memory in healthy
volunteers. One hundred and two participants completed two source memory tasks: one involved the
completion of well-known word pairs (e.g. Fish and? ) and the other was an action based task (e.g. nod your
head). At test participants needed to indicate whether the act had been performed or imagined by themselves,
performed by the experimenter, or was new. The positive dimension of schizotypy was positively correlated with
errors in internal source monitoring i.e. confusing participant performed and imagined acts. Furthermore, the
same dimension of schizotypy was also positively associated with reality monitoring errors i.e. confusing
participant performed/imagined with experimenter performed items. However, these relationships were not
found in the word pair task. Our ﬁndings suggest that there might be overlap in the processes required to
retrieve source information from memory, particularly for actions, and the occurrence of unusual experiences in
healthy volunteers.
1. Introduction
Occasional problems with retrieving the origin, or source, of
information from our personal past can be seen in everyday life, from
when we forget or confuse who told us a certain piece of information to
wondering whether we just thought about replying to an email or
whether we actually did it. However, in certain psychiatric disorders
such as schizophrenia, these diﬃculties in episodic memory are far
more prevalent. Indeed, they reﬂect a core cognitive impairment
(Elvevag and Goldberg, 2000; Ragland et al., 2009), which is observed
in young medication-naïve patients (MacDonald et al., 2005) and
healthy ﬁrst-degree relatives of those with schizophrenia (Snitz et al.,
2006; Toulopoulou et al., 2003). These memory impairments are
largely unaﬀected by antipsychotic medication (Vinogradov et al.,
1997). Research which elucidates the nature of the memory impair-
ment is of vital importance because memory performance is one of the
strongest predictors of functional outcome (Green, 1996; Milev et al.,
2005).
Within episodic memory there is an important distinction between
knowing whether something has been encountered before or not and
being able to recover the speciﬁc details surrounding an event. The
former task can be based upon familiarity, whereas the latter task
requires the recollection of contextual details (Yonelinas, 2001). For
example, recognising that you have met someone before but not being
able to remember anything else would be consistent with the process of
familiarity, whereas remembering their name or where you know them
from would require recollection. Many experiments have been con-
ducted to determine whether the deﬁcit that individuals with schizo-
phrenia exhibit in memory performance is a result of impairments in
recollection and/or familiarity. Across a number of diﬀerent paradigms
a fairly consistent ﬁnding has been that individuals with schizophrenia
have impairments in recollection, but it is less clear whether they are
impaired on familiarity judgements (Anselmetti et al., 2007; Moritz
et al., 2003; but also see Weiss et al., 2008). A recent paper conducted a
quantitative review of studies on this issue, accounting for methodo-
logical diﬀerences between tasks (Libby et al., 2013). They found
deﬁcits in both processes in this group, but those in familiarity were
more variable and smaller in size.
Recollection of contextual information can be delineated further
into three diﬀerent judgement types (Source-Monitoring Framework;
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Johnson et al., 1993): i) reality monitoring, which is the discrimination
between internal and external sources of information, e.g. did I lock the
door or did someone else do it? ; ii) internal source monitoring, which
involves distinguishing memories from two internal sources, e.g. did I
send that email or just think about it? ; and iii) external source
monitoring which requires diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent external
sources, such as whether Jane or Grace told you an important fact.
A great deal of research has focussed on reality monitoring because
it has been proposed that it may play a role in the pathogenesis of some
of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and
delusions (Bentall et al., 1991; Frith, 1992; Frith and Done, 1988;
Rankin and O'Carroll, 1995). Studies which have examined this
capacity have typically involved presenting participants with either a
complete sentence or one where they need to ﬁll in the blank. In the
test phase participants need to indicate whether they generated the
word, it was given to them or is new (e.g. Vinogradov et al., 1997).
There is now substantial evidence to suggest that people with schizo-
phrenia have deﬁcits in reality monitoring and, in particular, that they
misattribute self-generated events to an external source (Johns et al.,
2001; Keefe et al., 2002; Vinogradov et al., 2008). As anticipated, many
of these studies found the deﬁcit to be linked to the positive symptoms
(Brébion et al., 2000, 2002). However other researchers have found
poor reality monitoring to be associated with negative symptoms
(Brébion et al., 2002; Moritz et al., 2003), thought disorder (Nienow
and Docherty, 2004), and a lack of association with clinical symptoms
has also been reported (Henquet et al., 2005).
More recently internal source monitoring has also been examined
because the distinction between imagination and reality is often
blurred in schizophrenia (Brébion et al., 2008; Mintz and Alpert,
1972). A wide variety of source monitoring tasks have been utilised to
study the performance of patients with schizophrenia. For example,
Gawęda et al. (2012) asked patients to either imagine or actually
perform an action and found that they confused the source of these
actions in a subsequent test phase.
A complementary strategy which other researchers have taken is to
adopt a ‘continuum approach’ to psychosis (Claridge, 1997; Johns and
Van Os, 2001; Van Os et al., 2000, 2009). According to this view many
of the symptoms seen in schizophrenia, such as paranoid ideation and
hearing voices, can also be found in the general population; albeit to a
milder or attenuated degree which would normally cause much less
distress to the experiencing individual (Freeman et al., 2008; Johns
et al., 2014). This continuum of personality characteristics and
experiences is known as schizotypy. Action tasks have also been used
in healthy volunteers and performance on them related to schizotypal
traits. Consistent with the ﬁndings in patients with schizophrenia,
deﬁcits have been found in an internal source monitoring action task in
individuals who have high proneness to hallucinations (Collignon et al.,
2005) and those high in schizotypy (Peters et al., 2007).
The aim of the current study was to provide a more detailed and
integrated understanding of source memory and its relationship to
schizotypy in a large sample of healthy volunteers. The ﬁrst issue we
wished to examine was whether individuals high in schizotypy would
display deﬁcits in familiarity. On the basis of the review by Libby et al.
(2013) it would be anticipated that a deﬁcit in discriminating old from
new items would be seen in those high in schizotypal traits. However,
research ﬁndings on this issue have been mixed: Peters et al. (2007)
found evidence for a deﬁcit, whereas Collignon et al. (2005) did not.
Next, we investigated source memory by assessing in the same
participants reality monitoring and internal source monitoring.
Previous work reported only deﬁcits in internal source monitoring
but not in reality monitoring (Collignon et al., 2005). This is surprising
given the wealth of work highlighting problems in reality monitoring in
schizophrenia (Johns et al., 2001; Keefe et al., 2002; Vinogradov et al.,
2008). Therefore, we wished to examine whether individuals scoring
high on schizotypy would have a deﬁcit in both of these types of
memory.
It has been argued by some researchers that the generalisability of
word based paradigms to real-world situations is limited (Henquet
et al., 2005; Parks, 1997) and that action based tasks might be a more
naturalistic method of examining source memory. However no study
has given participants these two types of tasks and assessed whether
they both lead to the same ﬁndings. Therefore in this study participants
completed two source memory tasks: one where a word needed to be
generated (e.g. Fish and? ) and an action based task (e.g. nod your
head). In both of these tasks participants needed to indicate at test
whether the action was i) performed, ii) imagined, iii) performed by the
experimenter, or iv) was new. We hypothesised that source memory
deﬁcits would be related to the positive dimension of schizotypy and so
focussed primarily on this dimension, due to the ﬁndings of previous
studies in this area (e.g. Brébion et al., 2000, 2002; Collignon et al.,
2005; Peters et al., 2007).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
One hundred and ten individuals took part in this study for
payment or course credit. All participants were aged between 18 and
35 years, reported no diagnosis of any psychiatric disorder, were not
currently taking psychotropic medication or illicit substances and
possessed a high level of ﬂuency in English. Eight participants were
excluded from the study because their performance on the memory
task(s) failed to exceed a threshold of 0.1 above chance i.e. less than 0.1
for corrected recognition and source accuracy of less than 0.43. Thus
102 participants (mean age 22.30 years, 80 females) were included in
the study. Ethical approval was received for the study from institutional
review, and all participants provided informed consent to take part.
2.2. Materials and procedure
Participants completed two memory tasks as part of a larger battery
(there were no other memory tasks). The order of completion of the
tasks was ﬁxed across participants. The whole testing session took a
maximum of two hours and participants were all tested individually.
2.2.1. Memory tasks
The action task involved one study-test block separated by 100 min.
At study participants were asked to sit in a neutral position (arms and
legs uncrossed) at a table opposite the experimenter. On the table were
objects needed to complete some of the actions and a stack of cards
with an action printed on it and above this who should complete it
(Participant Perform, Participant Imagine, Experimenter Perform).
Each card was turned over by the experimenter one at a time and the
participant/experimenter was encouraged to complete the action in a
timely manner (usually a maximum of 6 s). There were 75 actions with
an equal number in each action condition. Approximately half required
everyday objects (e.g. stretch the rubber band, staple pieces of paper
together, draw a line with the ruler) and the others were actions
without using objects (e.g. nod your head, stand up and sit down, look
backwards). The majority of these actions were taken from Collignon
et al. (2005). An additional 12 actions were used as practice trials at the
start of the study and test phases. All objects were removed prior to the
test phase. Here all actions presented in the study phase were randomly
intermixed with 25 new actions. The action was presented on a
computer screen for 2000 ms. Participants were asked to recall
whether they performed the action in the study phase (Participant
Perform, PP), did they imagine completing the action (Participant
Imagine, PI), whether they watched the experimenter perform the
action (Experimenter Perform, EP) or whether the action was New.
The word task also had one study-test block but with an interval of
45 min. It was completed on a computer. In the study phase 72 widely
known but incomplete word pairs were presented in the centre of the
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display one at a time, e.g. Mum and? , Bread and? (most were taken
from Simons et al., 2008) with the condition displayed directly above
the incomplete word pairs. In the Participant Perform condition the
participant generated the second word and said it out loud, or they
imagined the second word (Participant Imagine condition) or listened
to the experimenter complete the word pair (Experimenter Perform
condition). After the act had been performed the participant needed to
press a key to indicate which condition had just been completed. This
terminated the trial and the next one commenced. An additional 12
word pairs were used as practice trials at the start of the study and test
phases. Participants were asked to complete the word pairs to create a
rich encoding context and to produce comparable levels of performance
between the two source tasks. In the test phase all actions presented in
the study phase were randomly intermixed with 24 new actions. The
ﬁrst word of the pair was presented until the participant made a
response. Only the ﬁrst word of the pair was presented because
occasionally participants generate a diﬀerent second word to what
would normally be expected. The discrimination at test was the same as
in the action task test phase. For both memory tests participants were
encouraged to respond as quickly but as accurately as they could and
actions/word pairs were counterbalanced across conditions.
2.2.2. Measurement of schizotypy
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-
LIFE; Mason et al., 1995) has four dimensions: unusual experiences,
which indexes experiences akin to hallucinations and delusions;
introvertive anhedonia, which describes a lack of pleasure in social or
physical activities; cognitive disorganisation, which taps distractibility
and disorganisation; and impulsive nonconformity which describes
reckless and antisocial behaviour. There has been evidence which
questions whether impulsive nonconformity is a meaningful schizotypy
construct, so this dimension was not considered further (Cochrane
et al., 2010). The mean schizotypy scores obtained were as follows
(standard deviations in parentheses): unusual experiences, 7.31 (5.83);
introvertive anhedonia, 5.05 (4.52); and cognitive disorganisation,
12.31 (5.83).1
3. Results
As most of the data from the memory tasks and the unusual
experiences dimension were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, ps < 0.01) non-parametric tests were used in analyses i.e.
Spearman's rho correlations (ρ). Alpha was set at 0.05 and all analyses
were two-tailed. The descriptive data from the memory tasks can be
seen in Table 1.
3.1. Action memory task
Initially data were examined in terms of the proportion of actions
correctly recognised as old (Hits) and the new items falsely identiﬁed as
old (False Alarms). From these data a corrected recognition score can
be calculated (Hits – False Alarms; Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988)
which gives an index of a participant's ability to discriminate old from
new items, see Table 1. A signiﬁcant negative correlation was found
between the corrected recognition score and the unusual experiences
dimension of schizotypy [ρ(100) =−0.28, p=0.004].
A measure of overall source accuracy was calculated as the total
number of items correctly assigned to Participant Perform, Participant
Imagine and Experimenter Perform sources divided by the number of
Participant Perform, Participant Imagine and Experimenter Perform
items correctly identiﬁed as old (regardless of whether the source
judgment was correct). There was a negative correlation between
source accuracy and scores on the unusual experiences dimension,
ρ(100)=−0.21, p=0.034. Given that source errors on this task could be
due to internal source monitoring i.e. confusing Participant Imagine
with Participant Perform and vice versa; or reality monitoring i.e.
confusing Participant Perform/Imagine with Experimenter Perform
and vice versa, these were assessed separately. Fig. 1 displays the
number of internal source monitoring and reality monitoring errors,
which correspond to the black and white bars, respectively. The
notation used in the ﬁgure and below is that the ﬁrst abbreviation
corresponds to the actual source and the one after is the participant's
memory judgement e.g. PP/PI would be an item that the participant
performed but which they thought they had imagined. A signiﬁcant
relationship was found between unusual experiences and total number
of internal source memory errors (the sum of errors in PP/PI and PI/
PP conditions, see Fig. 1), ρ(100)=0.22, p=0.03.
Moreover, there was also a signiﬁcant positive correlation between
unusual experiences and the overall number of reality monitoring
errors (the sum of errors in PP/EP, PI/EP, EP/PP, and EP/PI
conditions, see Fig. 1), ρ(100)=0.24, p=0.014. There is a wealth of
evidence demonstrating that reality monitoring problems in schizo-
phrenia are in the direction of misattributing self-generated events to
an external source i.e. externalising (e.g. Vinogradov et al., 1997,
2008). Therefore two additional correlations were conducted separately
for two components of the reality monitoring score. There was a
signiﬁcant relationship between unusual experiences and errors in
attributing an action that the participant performed to the experimen-
ter (PP/EP), ρ(100)=0.27, p=0.005; but we did not ﬁnd the same
relationship for imagined actions (PI/EP), ρ(100)=0.13, p=0.19.
3.2. Word pair task
We analysed this task within the same framework as described
above for the action task. There were no signiﬁcant correlations
between unusual experiences and corrected recognition score [ρ(100)
=−0.02, p=0.81] or overall source memory accuracy [ρ(100)=−0.07,
p=0.48]. There were also no signiﬁcant associations with number of
internal source memory errors [ρ(100) =0.15, p=0.14] or reality
monitoring errors [ρ(100)=0.19, p=0.06]. No signiﬁcant relationships
were found between unusual experiences and externalising errors (ps >
0.88).
3.3. Other schizotypy dimensions
Although the focus of this study was on the unusual experiences
dimension correlations were also conducted with the introvertive
anhedonia and cognitive disorganisation dimensions of schizotypy to
determine the speciﬁcity of the relationship. As can be seen from
Table 2 there were no relationships with the introvertive anhedonia
dimension but some with cognitive disorganisation. This might have
resulted from the high degree of correlation between unusual experi-
ences and cognitive disorganisation (ρ(100) =0.65, p < 0.001).
4. Discussion
The aim of this study was to provide a more detailed understanding
Table 1.
Mean proportions with standard deviations in parentheses for each of the memory tasks.
Action task Word pair task
Hits 0.79 (0.10) 0.75 (0.11)
False Alarms 0.20 (0.17) 0.22 (0.18)
Corrected Recognition 0.59 (0.18) 0.54 (0.17)
Source Accuracy 0.81 (0.10) 0.75 (0.10)
1 The 8 participants who were excluded had mean schizotypy scores as follows
(standard deviations in parentheses): unusual experiences, 4.57 (3.99); introvertive
anhedonia, 10.71 (5.44); and cognitive disorganisation, 6.29 (7.99). Including these
participants in the main analysis did not alter the patterns of correlations.
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of the nature of the memory deﬁcits associated with the schizotypy
continuum. A signiﬁcant negative correlation was found between the
positive dimension of schizotypy (unusual experiences) and the cor-
rected recognition score, indicating that participants high in unusual
experiences exhibited poorer old-new discrimination. Furthermore,
they were also more inclined to make errors in determining the source
of the memory, even in those items correctly recalled as old. In
particular, there was a positive correlation between unusual experi-
ences and internal source monitoring errors; those participants with
high scores on this dimension confused whether they had performed an
act or just imagined doing it. There was also a positive relationship
between the same schizotypy dimension and reality monitoring errors
i.e. in determining whether the act originated from the participant
(performed or imagined) or the experimenter. Consistent with previous
research there was an externalising bias, such that those high in
unusual experiences tended to attribute actions they had physically
performed themselves to the experimenter (PP/EP errors). However
we did not ﬁnd the same pattern of results for those acts the participant
had just imagined (PI/EP errors). All of these relationships were only
found in the action based task.
It is widely acknowledged that individuals with schizophrenia have
deﬁcits in recollection but ﬁndings on familiarity have been less
consistent (Achim and Lepage, 2003; Libby et al., 2013; Ranganath
et al., 2008). This is also true in schizotypy work, for example Peters
et al. (2007) found evidence for deﬁcits in old-new recognition,
whereas Collignon et al. (2005) did not. It is possible that the particular
measure of schizotypy used may be important. Collignon et al. (2005)
used a measure that speciﬁcally assessed hallucinatory proneness
(Launay and Slade Hallucinations Scale; Launay and Slade, 1981),
whereas Peters et al. (2007) used the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire (Claridge and Broks, 1984) and the current study used
the unusual experiences dimension of the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995).
These latter questionnaires index positive symptoms more widely and,
for example, also encompass distortions in sensory experiences and
psychotic-like delusional ideation. Thus it would appear to be the case
that diﬃculties in making old-new discriminations are related to
positive symptom-like experiences more broadly, or a speciﬁc aspect
of these, but not hallucinations.
The ﬁnding of more internal source errors being related to high
unusual experiences scores is consistent with the work of Collignon
et al. (2005) and Peters et al. (2007). However, we have extended this
ﬁnding to include reality monitoring errors being associated with the
positive dimension of schizotypy as well, which was not found by
Collignon et al. (2005). There are methodological diﬀerences between
the current study and that by Collignon et al. (2005) which might
explain this. Firstly, in the latter study there were more conditions for
participants to diﬀerentiate between; they had the added conditions of
the participant imagining the experimenter performing the action and
the experimenter verbalising the action (but not performing it).
Secondly, the way the test response was made was quite diﬀerent with
Collignon et al. (2005) requiring participants to make a four-stage
response at test compared to just one-stage in this study. Finally, their
participants made very few errors (mean of < 1) in some of the
conditions, particularly those relevant to reality monitoring, such as
participant performed and experimenter performed. These ﬂoor eﬀects
might have precluded relationships being found with hallucinatory
proneness by Collignon et al. (2005).
The Source-Monitoring Framework (Johnson et al., 1993) oﬀers a
useful way of understanding the errors that people make when trying to
retrieve the source of a piece of information. According to this frame-
work there are no speciﬁc memory ‘tags’ or markers on events
indicating where they originated. Instead, various attributes of the
memory encoded at the time it happened later serve as the basis for
making the decision as to its origin. These attributes include qualities
like perceptual, semantic, spatial, temporal, sensorimotor and aﬀective
details and records of cognitive operations that created them (Johnson
et al., 1993; Johnson and Raye, 1981). For example, a memory that is
rich in perceptual detail, with substantial contextual information but a
lack of consciously remembered details of the cognitive operations
which might have generated it would likely be judged as having been
perceived, whereas the opposite proﬁle would be associated with
imagined experiences. Therefore, anything which increases the simi-
larity of these memory attributes from diﬀerent sources will decrease
source accuracy. For example, if imagination was particularly vivid and
detailed this could be confused with an event that was actually
experienced. This is pertinent because there has been a wealth of
research demonstrating that people with schizophrenia (Mintz and
Alpert, 1972; Rasmussen and Parnas, 2015) and those high in
schizotypy (Currie, 2000; Winﬁeld and Kamboj, 2010) tend to have
more active and vibrant imaginations (Oertel et al., 2009; Sack et al.,
2005). In future research it might be useful to include a measure of how
Fig. 1. The mean number of errors produced in each memory task (action on the left, word pairs on the right) with error bars ( ± SEM). Internal source monitoring errors are in the
black bars and reality monitoring errors in the white bars. Abbreviations are as follows: PP (Participant Perform), PI (Participant Imagine), and EP (Experimenter Perform). The ﬁrst
abbreviation is the actual source of the event and the second one is what the participant stated.
Table 2.
Spearman's rho correlation matrix showing coefficients between reality monitoring (RM)
and internal source monitoring errors (ISM) and dimensions of the O-LIFE.
Action task Word pair task
RM ISM RM ISM
Unusual experiences 0.24* 0.22* 0.19 0.15
Introvertive anhedonia 0.06 0.07 −0.05 −0.01
Cognitive disorganisation 0.14 0.22* 0.24* 0.13
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well participants feel they are able to imagine completing acts as this
could mediate the relationship between schizotypy/schizophrenia and
memory performance.
The novel ﬁnding from this study is that signiﬁcant relationships
were found between memory measures and unusual experiences in the
action task but not the word pair one. The same direction of result was
found in the word pair task, between schizotypy and internal and
reality monitoring errors, but these did not reach statistical signiﬁ-
cance. This suggests that the action task might have greater utility in
examining relationships with symptoms or experiences. Due to the
well-known enactment eﬀect (Cohen, 1989; Madan and Singhal, 2012)
the study-test interval for the action task was longer (100 min) than for
the word pair task (45 min). This was done to ensure that performance
was not at ceiling in the action task and both tasks were broadly
comparable in terms of participant performance. As can be seen from
Fig. 1 the proﬁle of errors between tasks is similar. Moreover, the
errors also exhibit a similar proﬁle as to what might be anticipated. For
example, there is less overall confusion between Participant Perform
and Experimenter Perform than between Participant Imagine and
Experimenter Perform. This is likely due to the fact that when the
participant performs the act there is movement as well as aﬀerent
feedback but this is not present when they imagine the act or watch the
experimenter perform it, which makes the former two conditions more
distinctive than the latter two.
The action memory task has been used in a number of studies both
in schizophrenia and schizotypy (Collignon et al., 2005; Gawęda et al.,
2012; Peters et al., 2007) and there is substantial evidence that people
with schizophrenia have abnormalities in the awareness of motor
actions (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000). Computational
models of motor control have been developed and these have been
applied to schizophrenia, particularly the forward model (Wolpert,
1997). According to this account, whenever a motor command is
initiated a parallel eﬀerence copy is also generated (Von Holst, 1954).
This can be used to make predictions about the sensory consequences
of an action, which can be compared with the actual sensory feedback
of a movement. If the predicted action and the sensory input match
then the action would be considered to be self-generated.
In schizophrenia it is thought that there may be deﬁcits in the
generation of the eﬀerence copy and/or in the comparison between
predicted and actual action which results in certain positive symptoms
(Frith, 2005, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2010). Importantly, this would
produce externalising errors, which have been found in a number of
studies (for a review, see Brookwell et al., 2013), because a lack of
eﬀerence copy or a mismatch between prediction and reality would
suggest an external source of a change in the state of one's body (e.g.
position of a limb). In the current study we only found a relationship
between schizotypy and one type of externalising error: an act
physically performed by the participant being attributed to the
experimenter and not when the act had only been imagined by the
participant. One potential explanation for this is that perhaps the
forward model, and the hypothesised deﬁcits that individuals within
the schizophrenia spectrum have with aspects of this, can only be
applied to overt actions and not internal mental events such as thinking
and imagining. Indeed, this model was adapted and used by Frith and
colleagues to explain such phenomena as delusions of control and
anarchic hand (e.g. Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Frith et al., 2000). A
number of arguments have been raised about the possibility of
extending this model to covert forms of behaviour, such as thinking.
Gallagher (2004) argues that using the forward model makes sense for
overt actions because we need to know if our actions are internally or
externally caused (i.e. did I move my arm or did someone else? ) and if
our action is not going to achieve its goal this needs to be known in
advance so that adjustments can be made. However, these reasons do
not make sense when applied to thoughts. All our thoughts are
internally generated, so there is never any possibility of having to work
out whether it was you who thought something or someone else, in
normal circumstances. Thus there is currently a great deal of debate
around whether Frith's forward model can be applied to internal
mental states (for other work on this issue see Seal et al., 2004;
Stephens and Graham, 2000; Vicente, 2014).
To conclude, our results demonstrate that there is a negative
relationship between scores on the positive dimension of schizotypy,
unusual experiences, and the ability to correctly identify the source of
memory information. Furthermore, our correlational analyses indi-
cated that individuals with high scores on unusual experiences have
deﬁcits in distinguishing between actions they performed versus i)
imagined and ii) those the experimenter performed. These relation-
ships were only found in the action based task and further research is
now needed to determine if a similar set of results would be found in
people with schizophrenia.
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